



A SE4AI Framework for the SE of Autonomous Systems *Considering Data Through the Life-Cycle*

Jawahar Bhalla (JB)
University of Adelaide & Shoal
Group

Prof Stephen C. Cook
University of Adelaide & Shoal
Group

Dr David Harvey
University of Adelaide

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SHOALTM

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THE UNIVERSITY
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RAAF B707 – 1979 to 2008



29 October 1991



RAAF B707 – 29 October 1991

The last minute in the lives of five flyers

THE last minute of recorder tape during the training exercise.

0.58 — Sound of decreasing engine.

0.53 — Captain: Trelle ... wrestle with the beastie!

0.50 — Landing gear unsafe warning horn sounds briefly.

Co-pilot: OK, I can afford to wash off a bit more speed.

0.40 — Co-pilot: Got, ah 10 degrees of bank and full rudder and I'm still starting to veer away. I'm still ...

Captain: OK.

0.32 — Co-pilot: ... put a bit more aileron in — I can —

Captain: So, how are we



A RAAF 707 like the one which crashed near Sale.

going to get out of it?

0.28 — Co-pilot: OK

0.27 — Captain or third pilot: Watch out!

Captain: Woah! Woah! Sound of objects flying around the cockpit.

0.22 — Captain: Taking over!

Co-pilot: Handing over!

0.17 — Third pilot: Mayday! Mayday! Windsor

Sounds of grunting. Sound of warning horn.

Captain: Ah!

0.10 — Co-pilot: You want, you want the rudder boost on?

Captain: Yeah! Boost on! Sale air traffic controller: Windsor 380, Approach?

0.07 — Co-pilot: Windsor 380, Mayday!

Sale: Windsor 380, Roger Mayday!

0.00 — Exclamations. Tape stops.

RAAF B707 – 29 October 1991

“The RAAF Boeing 707 stalled and crashed into the sea. The crash was attributed to a simulation of asymmetric flight resulting in a sudden and violent departure from controlled flight.”

“It’s the first fatal accident in Airlift Group or the transport force since 1961, that’s 30 years of accident-free flying.”
Richmond RAAF Base Air Commodore
Stan Clark

29 October 1991


RAAF B707-368C (A20-103) - Board of Inquiry concluded...
“There were deficiencies in the documented procedures and limitations pertaining to asymmetric flight in the 707 and a lack of fidelity in the RAAF 707 simulator in the flight regime in which the accident occurred,”

Airlift Simulators Project (ALSIM)




B-707 Level-D FFS 1995-1998

Personal Journey in High-Fidelity M&S



Situational Awareness

Mica Endsley – *Towards a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems*. Human Factors Journal 37(1), 32-64



A Need to Train the “AI” Right


TRAIN



CERTIFY



VERIFY



VALIDATE

Exaptation, also radical repurposing, is the *taking of an idea, concept, tool, method, framework, etc., intended to address one thing, and using it to address a different thing, often in another domain* [Cynefin.io/wiki/exaptation]

A Need to Train the “AI” Right

TRAIN

Motivation & Focus

VERIFY



Modelling & Simulation

AI Development Approaches

Core Enabling Concepts


A Conceptual SE4AI Framework


Related & Future Work

Key Points

CERTIFY


VALIDATE






“Navy needs maritized RAS-AI (*Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence*) capabilities which address factors including geography; the maritime and strategic environment; and the national Defence ecosystem”

Priority – “Develop and adopt governance systems to ensure robotics and AI solutions improve Australia’s well-being and protect democratic values”











A need for a SE & Assurance framework that would build in *design integrity*, system *safety*, and *security* and enable ongoing *assurance* through a highly *evolutionary* AI capability life-of-type context.



There is a need to engineer and assure safe and secure AI applications holistically from a first-principles, systems perspective, considering their nuances to tailor the core SE pillars of *Requirements Engineering (RE)*, *Architectural Design*, *Verification and Validation (V&V)* and *end-to-end traceability*





A need for an SE & Assurance for AI framework that would build in *design integrity*, system *safety*, and *security* and enable ongoing *assurance* through a highly *evolutionary* AI capability life-of-type context.



This presentation outlines a conceptual refinement to contemporary evolutionary developmental practice for the SE of AI-Intensive systems (SE4AI).

The focus is on the end-to-end curation of reference data used as a basis for ML model design verification, model-training, and model-validation.



“A set of methods and tools that originated from software engineering in a system lifecycle” (Bosch et al., 2020)

AI systems “have inherently different characteristics than software systems alone” (Ozkaya, 2020) and Fujii et al (2020) and Bosch et al (2020) identified **four developmental focus areas** unique to AI applications.



DATA Quality
Sufficiency of data sets / streams for Training & Inference



Model Performance
(Verification) - Training & Operational Scope



Design Methods & Processes
Scalability & Repeatability



Deployment & Compliance
Monitoring, Logging, Testing, Troubleshooting

Teams at Microsoft blend data management tools with their ML frameworks to avoid the fragmentation of data and model management activities, and the rapid evolution of data sources (Amershi et al., 2019)

“A set of methods and tools that originated from software engineering in a system lifecycle” (Bosch et al., 2020)

There is an implicit (and natural evolutionary “bottom-up”) focus on the realization of a fielded software system or “Product Baseline”, with at best, implied reference (via requirements) to an associated “Functional Baseline”.



DATA Quality

Sufficiency of data sets / streams for Training & Inference



Model Performance

(Verification) - Training & Operational Scope

Evolutionary focus on the PBL with regards to CM

A perceived lack of explicit traceability (FBL, ABL, PBL, Data)

V&V inherently a “Validation add-on” based on Data




SE CM baseline rigor (FBL, ABL, PBL) and design integrity control (traceability across baselines), essentially shifts focus (post first iteration) to a progressive evolution of a PBL – exacerbates objective dependability/explainability.

Systems Engineering Practice

Modelling & Simulation

Data Curation Criticality

Situational Awareness





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Systems Engineering Practice


Modelling & Simulation

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Alternative View – Evolutionary / Agile / Incremental Life-Cycle (depicted serially)





Systems Engineering Practice

Modelling & Simulation

Data Curation Criticality

Situational Awareness

An Evolutionary / Agile Depiction of the SE Life-Cycle identifying Configuration Baselines with traced integrity preserved across and through Releases



“Digital Threads” Integrity Preserved Through-Life

Systems Engineering Practice


Modelling & Simulation

Data Curation Criticality

Situational Awareness

A **Model** is a Physical, Mathematical or Logical *abstraction* (of a System, Entity, Phenomenon, Activity or Process) for a *particular purpose* (i.e. a *suitable representation*)

A **Simulation** is an **Enactment** (Method of Implementing) a **Model** over **Time**



A Map (**model**) of Sydney

Real-Time GPS navigation (**simulation**) using “map **models**”



A **Simulator** → The Tool that **Executes** the **Simulation**

Systems Engineering Practice


Modelling & Simulation

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A Simulation



Model over Time



A **Simulator** → The Tool that **Executes** the **Simulation**


Systems Engineering Practice

Modelling & Simulation

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Situational Awareness

Audio Images from Pixabay



Fidelity → Concept of “Goodness” or “Suitability” of a Model



Amplitude	Fixed-On	Fixed-On/Off	Variable Range	Fully Replicated	Resolution
Frequency	Fixed-Pitch	Representative	Sensed Range	Fully Replicated	Resolution
Direction	Mono-Phonic	Stereo-Phonic	Stereo-Surround	Fully Replicated	Resolution


Fidelity → Concept of “Goodness” or “Suitability” of a Model




Breadth of Scope (Forms, Properties, Functions) / Depth of Resolution (Granularity)





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



Fidelity → Concept of “Goodness” or “Suitability” of a Model












Proposed Refinement - Evolutionary SE Life-Cycle (ICMS view) with ML Focused VTAVD Overlay



Proposed Refinement - Evolutionary SE Life-Cycle (ICMS view) with ML Focused VTAVD Overlay

VTAVD Requirements

- Across applicable Use-Cases & Sensors including changes to previous baselines
- VTAVD Category [Ver, Trg, Val]
 - Scope, range and units
 - Source/s for procurement of VTAVD
 - Associated Constraints/Conditions/IP

VTAVD Procurement


- In accordance with the required VTAVD
- Procurement from nominated source/s
 - Suitability Review / Corrective actions
 - VTAVD refinement (cleaning) and
 - **VTAVD Authorisation** as the **Data Baseline (DBL)** for design Verification, model Training And model Validation.

Model Training & Validation


In accordance with the A-VTAVD Training and Validation reference data that forms the DBL with **“ECP action”** for any changes or discrepancies identified in the FBL, DBL, ABL and PBL.

Model Design Verification



Conduct of Model Design Verification IAW the A-VTAVD Model Verification Data that forms part of the DBL with **“ECP action”** for any changes to the FBL, DBL or ABL.



An Evolutionary / Agile Depiction of the SE Life-Cycle identifying Configuration Baselines (integrity) through Development and Releases



Proposed Refinement - Evolutionary SE Life-Cycle (ICMS view) with ML Focused VTAVD Overlay



Engineering / Modification of MAS

An Evolutionary / Agile Depiction of the SE Life-Cycle identifying Configuration Baselines (Integrity) through Development and Releases

SE4AI

"A Conceptual Framework for the SE of AI-Intensive Systems (SE4AI) – Considering Data Through the Life-Cycle", INCOSE IS 2023, Honolulu, USA, 15th – 20th July 2023

MAS Design Data			
FCD	ACD	PCD	ICS
FCA	PCA	MSR	OQE


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MAS HW & SW			
Controlling AI/ML Autonomous Subsystem			
Navigation	Weapons	Platform	
Sensors	Fuel	Controls	
Propulsion	Power	Comms	
Enabling HW/SW			

Assurance of Built / Modified MAS

As4AI

"Towards A Systems Framework for the Assurance of Maritime Autonomous Systems", The Australian Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Engineering (AJMDE), 12th August 2023



TRUSTED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

Australian Code of Practice for the Design, Construction, Survey and Operation of Autonomous and Remotely Operated Vessels

Edition 2 – October 2023

Safety Regulations for Maritime Autonomous Systems

AMSA
Australian Maritime Safety Authority

Safety Regulations for Related MAS Assurance Capabilities

Engineering / Modification of MAS

An Evolutionary / Agile Depiction of the SE Life-Cycle identifying Configuration Baselines (Integrity) through Development and Releases

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MAS Design Data

FCD	FCA
ACD	PCA
PCD	MSR
ICS	OQE

+

MAS HW & SW

Controlling AI/ML Autonomous Subsystem		
Navigation	Weapons	Platform
Sensors	Fuel	Controls
Propulsion	Power	Comms
Enabling HW/SW		

Assurance of Built / Modified MAS

MAS to be "Assured"


Assurance

MAS Classification & Reg Applicability → Scenario and Environment Selection → Creation MAS Assurance Plan

As4AI

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This presentation has considered the challenge of SE of Autonomous Systems with a particular focus on the end-to-end curation of reference data used as a basis for **ML model design verification, model-training, and model-validation.**






Systems Engineering Practice


Modelling & Simulation

Data Curation Criticality

Situational Awareness



This presentation has considered the challenge of SE of AI-Intensive Systems with a particular focus on the end-to-end curation of reference data used as a basis for **ML model design verification**, **model-training**, and **model-validation**.



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