

SERC DOCTORAL STUDENT FORUM 2024 | NOVEMBER 13, 2024

# Exposing Bad Behavior in Operational Systems: An Unmanned Mission Model

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Visual Model

**Operational Context** 

Mission Modeling

**Outcome Analysis** 

Requirements

**Cost Analysis** 

Summary

## **Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF)**

#### Issues

- > A hybrid naval fleet of manned and unmanned platforms have a high risk of undocumented or poorly understood requirements.
- While policy directs a transition to digital engineering (DE) techniques, there is little evidence that demonstrates the benefits of model-based systems engineering (MBSE).


#### So What?

- Developed and refined a method to model system and system-of-systems (SoS) behavior
- Demonstrated using models and analysis alone to reveal a latent issue in an operational system-of-systems
  - Would have remained unfound with only system modeling.

"MBSE promises increased quality and affordability for one simple reason: The cheapest defect to fix is the one you prevented."



- A Country X survey ship, SEARCHER (AGOR-01), has been spotted in the vicinity of an underwater optical data cable.
  - Carries worldwide data including information between the United States and allied partners.
- USS DEEP WATER (SS-14) with elements of UUV Team 3 is tasked with conducting a search mission over the position and monitoring the movements of AGOR-01.
- While in transit, AGOR-01 gets underway. SS-14 launches two UUVs then continues on an intercept course.
  - The UUVs autonomously complete the search mission and are then recovered by the USS SHALLOW WATER (SC-22).




- If one or both UUVs fails to return to the Recovery Point, can we use models to:
  - Understand what went wrong?
  - Characterize mitigations to increase the likelihood of success?
  - Appreciate the implications of a change to the system prior to development?

#### **Build a Visual Model**

First, we transition from a mental model of the operational scenario to a more formal model of the problem space.


- 1. Two UUVs are launched from USS DEEP WATER (SS-14).
- 2. The UUVs complete an ingress along the path of the cable leading to the search area.
- 3. Each UUV completes a Survey Task over the assigned portion of the Search Area.
- 4. Each UUV meets at a Rendezvous position to exchange information then continues to localize any detected targets of interest.
- 5. Once complete, each UUV transits away from the cable towards the vicinity of USS SHALLOW WATER (SC-22)
- 6. The UUVs are recovered by SC-22.



## **Understand the Operational Context**


Next, we identify the key actors and actions.

- UUV System (SOI)
  - Two UUVs that conduct the search mission
- External actors involved in the search mission
  - Task Unit Commander
    - Tasks the UUV System and receives results of mission
  - Vessel of Opportunity (VOO)
    - Supports launch and recovery of the UUVs
  - > Environment
    - Search areas containing targets of interest
    - Position information




Modeling is focused on the interactions between the two in-mission UUVs and the Environment.

#### **A UUV Mission Model**




#### **Mission Outcomes**

- 4617 total outcomes for the search mission after analysis and pruning
  - Logical removes outcomes that "break" logic
  - Simplification removes outcomes to focus the analysis.
  - Scope removes outcomes from outside the context




## **Analysis – Mission Failure**



- Both UUVs experience a catastrophic failure during the mission.
- What could cause this outcome?
- Zoom into the individual task models.


## **Analysis – Survey Task Failure**




- UUV 1 operates as expected.
- UUV 2 fails to detect a target in the Search Area and Collides.

## **Analysis – Survey Task**

- 1. UUV 1 starts the Survey Task in the first Search Area moving south.
- 2. UUV 2 continues south and starts in the second Search Area moving north.
- 3. UUV 1 collides with an unknown target in its flight path, rendering it dead in the water.
- 4. UUV 2 completes the Survey Task and continues to the Rendezvous position.



## **Analysis – Rendezvous Task Failure**




UUV 1 attempts to complete UUV 2s Survey Task and suffers the same fate.

## **Analysis – Rendezvous Task**

UUV 1 is dead in the water from colliding with an undetected target in the northern Search Area.


- 5. After not hearing from UUV 1, UUV 2 assumes the northern survey is incomplete.
- 6. Continues to the southern edge of the Search Area and moves north.
- 7. UUV 2 collides with the same unknown target, rendering it dead in the water.



## What's Going On? – Changed Requirements

A. UUV 2 completes the Survey Task, detects Targets of Interest, and transits at the newly implemented Rendezvous location (RNDZ) to exchange information with UUV 1.

If UUV 2 never hears from UUV 1 what should happen next?




## **Analysis – Requirements Derivation**

B. Option to prioritize a complete survey of the Search Area

C. Option to prioritize identification of targets

Option B was selected by the program for implementation.





#### What Does it Take?

- Develop and verify the reusable models
  - >\$30K over four weeks
  - >Two UUVs running 24 hour search mission
    - 0.7% chance of catastrophic collision
    - 50% chance that the track of the second UUV is close enough to collide with the same object
    - \$1.5M replacement cost

- Analyze the results and discover the issue
  - >\$6K over one week between an SME and modeler



## Why Does it Matter?

- There is little scientific evidence that demonstrates the benefits of MBSE.
  - ➤ 360 of 847 papers in a literature review cited the "potential" of MBSE, only 2 provided a measured result
  - > Data collection, analysis, and repeatable methods
- This work demonstrates the "how" of coupling SE with models, automated tools, and subject matter expertise to find issues.
  - ➤ Used systems modeling tools, visual models, and the formal methods to expose an issue that would have remained hidden if only the individual UUV was modeled.
  - ➤ In this case, use models to consider alternatives **before** development, e.g., offset the survey tracks to lower the chance of a second collision.



## Thank you!

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## **Unmanned Systems**

- To meet strategic objectives, the Navy needs a new hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned systems (UxS).
  - Extend sensor reach, provide additional weapons capacity, and supplement logistics in a resource-constrained environment.
- New technologies show promise but introduce new risk not present with current systems
  - China, Russia, and Iran have captured, tampered with, or destroyed U.S. UxS







## **Systems Modeling**

- Systems are made to address a need, i.e., each system has a purpose.
- Models are abstractions of a system, aimed at answering a question of interest.
- System models describe what it needs to do (requirements, behavior, structure) and the analysis between each domain.
- Current languages, tools, and methods capture what we want but lack a clear way to understand what is possible.

"We do not think and talk about what we see; we see what we are able to think and talk about."






- Monterey Phoenix (MP) is a formal language developed by the Naval Postgraduate School for behavior modeling.
- Used to help understand intended behavior, uncover assumptions, and expose emergent system or process behaviors.
  - What is the intended sequence of events?
  - What are the range of potential outcomes?
  - How many outcomes contain unexpected behaviors?
  - What risk do these behaviors pose to the system and/or process?
    - How can these risks be mitigated?


### **Monterey Phoenix – How it Works**

- Based on the stakeholder needs, model the initial problem space.
  - System of Interest (SOI), the external actors, and their individual behavior.
- Formally express the behavior in MP language, i.e., a directed graph.




## **Monterey Phoenix – Outcome Generation**

- After you transition from SysML to the MP language. The corresponding tool rapidly generates all possible paths through a given graph.
- SOI *a*<sub>0</sub>
  - $\triangleright$  7 nodes,  $a_1 a_7$
  - > 10 edges,  $e_1$   $e_{10}$




## **Monterey Phoenix – Added Complexity**

- Add an external actor, system  $b_0$
- Generate the outcomes of each actor and review to clarify
  - $\gt 5 \ a_0$  and 3  $b_0$  outcomes
  - > 15 outcomes
- Add cross-system interactions
  - $\triangleright$  2 edges,  $x_1 x_2$
  - > 5 outcomes
- Powerful at high numbers to filter, reject, and rigorously expose and document what we want our systems to do, i.e., define the functional requirements, compared to what is possible.




## **Monterey Phoenix – Outcome Generation**




Quickly iterate between the planned architecture and what is possible to expose unexpected and unacceptable behavior.


## **Operational Context - Design Reference Mission**




## **Operational Context - Design Reference Mission**




## **Operational Context – UUV Mission**



## **Operational Context – UUV Mission**



#### **UUV Mission – Success**



- Focused on a two UUV system conducting the mission.
- Quantitate analysis of failure rates and underwater communication